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COMMENT
LIBERTY OR DEATH: MARYLAND IMPROVES UPON THE
MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT

FRANKLIN

H.

ALDEN JR.*

I. INTRODUCTION
In today's world, one can realistically wax nostalgic about the "good old
days" when nuclear annihilation was the only potentially imminent cause of
millions of civilian casualties. In the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001,
the United States has confronted new and terrifying methods by which hostile
parties could inflict damage on American citizens. Experts have identified three
categories to describe what are ubiquitously referred to as weapons of mass
destruction (WMD): nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) agents, against
which defense planning involves governmental and civil service agencies, from
local municipalities up to the federal government.'
To counter these threats, various states and the federal government have
enacted legislation of varying scopes, which enable governmental entities to
impose drastic health and safety measures upon citizens. Many states have
adopted, in one form or another, legislation based upon the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA).2
This document provides for
sweeping executive powers in the event of an NBC attack. Maryland adopted its

* J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Maryland School of Law (Baltimore, MD); B.A., Liberal Arts,
1993, St. John's College (Annapolis, MD). I wish to express my love and gratitude to my parents and
my wife Christine for their support and inspiration during the writing of this article.
I. See generally Richard T. Cupitt, Current and Future Weapons of Mass Destruction, Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services of the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs (Nov. 7, 2001), http://www.bioterrorism.slu.edu/bt/official/
congress/cupittll0701.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2005) (suggesting steps to address concerns
surrounding weaknesses in a multilateral coordination of WMD exports); Donald E. L. Johnson,
Hospitals and Country Are 'Woefully Unprepared'forBioterrorismAttacks, HEALTH CARE STRATEGIC
MGMT., Oct. 1, 2001, at 14; Peter Chalk, Misguided Assumptions, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 21,

2001, at B9.
2. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (MSEHPA) (Ctr. for Law and the Public's
Health 2001), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPAIMSEHPA2.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2005)
[hereinafter MSEHPA].
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own version of the Model Act legislation in 2001. 3 Both the MSEHPA and the
Maryland Emergency Powers Acts raise concerns over the amount of judicial
recourse available to an affected citizen. This article explores both documents in
this regard, and argues that the protective measures implemented in the Maryland
statute improve upon the MSEHPA, but should be regularly reviewed to preserve,
inasmuch as it is possible during an NBC attack, the basic civil liberties protection
that judicial recourse offers to vulnerable citizens.

II. BACKGROUND

Planning prospectively for contingencies in this realm necessitates potential
governmental action on a massive scale, which is at a minimum tangential to
constitutional due process issues.4 These activities may include the suspension of
habeas corpus rights, a policy implemented by President Abraham Lincoln in
Baltimore, Maryland, during the United States Civil War.5 Governmental action
may also extend to the taking and destruction of private property without
compensation 6 and forced vaccination or quarantine without adequate notice and
opportunity for access to legal counsel.7
Justifications for such drastic and far-reaching powers have always been
formidably persuasive. Under some possible vectors of a biological attack, such
measures, however unthinkably drastic, may not be sufficient to prevent deaths in

3. MD. CODE ANN., art. 41 §§ 2-201 to 2-204 (West 2003) (repealed 2004). This legislation was
recodified in 2004 and is now located at MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 14-3A-01 to 14-3A-05
(Supp.2004).
4. Those activities with due process considerations represent the scope of constitutional issues
addressed in this article.
5. ROBERT J. BRUGGER, MARYLAND: A MIDDLE TEMPERAMENT 279 (1988). Brugger describes
how Lincoln, deciding that Baltimore would likely lead Maryland into a secession that would leave
Washington D.C. isolated within the Confederacy, ordered federal troops into the city, occupying it. Id.
Officially suspending the writ of habeas corpus on April 27, 1861, General Benjamin F. Butler
proceeded under Lincoln's directive to arrest and imprison the publishers of all Baltimore newspapers
of Confederate sympathy. Id. The publishers were imprisoned in Fort McHenry without hearing or
access to legal counsel. Id. at 281. Chief Justice Roger Brook Taney of the Maryland Federal Circuit
Court protested in the famous letter to Lincoln, Ex ParteMerryman, arguing "the people of the United
States are no longer living under a government of laws, but every citizen holds life, liberty, and
property at the will and pleasure of the army officer in whose military district he may happen to be
found." Id. at 283. Lincoln did not respond to the letter, and most of the imprisoned remained so for
the balance of the War. Id.
6. See MSEHPA, supra note 2, § 506 ("Compensation shall not be provided for facilities that are
closed, evacuated, decontaminated or destroyed when there is reasonable cause to believe that they may
endanger the public health.").
7. Id. § 603.
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the hundreds of millions, 8 if not more. 9 The cultural perception of the likelihood of
force
such grave threats to national security have typically imposed a political
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Historically, in times of war or other contexts viewed by the federal
government as a national security threat, the three branches have adjusted the
balance between liberty and security like a barometer - tightening restrictions on
certain basic freedoms and relaxing them as times and perceptions change."'
Since September 11th, the legislatures of the 50 states have severally passed2
statutes designed to optimize governmental response and planning for anti-biotic'
countermeasures to a possible domestic biological attack. 13 Many states have
4
based their legislative structure and text, to varying degrees, on the MSEHPA.

8. See, e.g.,

RODOLFO ACUNA-SOTO ET AL., U.S. CENTER FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES (CID),

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC), MEGADROUGHT AND MEGADEATH IN 16TH

CENTURY MEXICO, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES BULLETIN 360, (April 1, 2002), http://www.cdc.

gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no4/pdf/01-0175.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2005) (recounting the catastrophic series
of epidemics that infected native Mexican peoples during the sixteenth century, following the arrival of
Europeans). The introduction of multiple infectious disease vectors into a culture, whose immune
systems had not previously encountered such biological agents, resulted in the deaths of an estimated
five to 15 million people in three years. Id. Eighty percent of the native Mexican population is
estimated to have fallen victim to these plagues. Id.
9. Biological agents against which humanity has not had an effective medical countermeasure
have, in the form of plagues, killed up to thirty percent of the afflicted population group, in a historical
period when the vectors of a biological agent inherent in jet-age human transport did not yet exist.
Susan Scott & Christopher F. Duncan, Yersinia Pestis: A Case of Mistaken Identity?, THE LANCET,
June 23, 2001, at 2061. (Vector, here, holds the same meaning as it does in physics - speed in a
direction. Unlike the application of the term in pure physics, however, the object in motion is a
biological agent and speed references the rate at which the agent is transmitted throughout a population
group.) Witness the trans-continental spread of SARS in the winter of 2002-2003. See M.A.J.
McKenna, Toronto Reports 20 New Cases of SARS; CDC Reinstates Alert for Travelers, J.-CONST.
(Atlanta), May 24, 2003, at 3A.
10. See PatriotAct: Follow-up Condemned as 'Assault on Civil Liberties,' TORONTO STAR, Feb.
23, 2003, at F04 (referring to strong criticisms by the American Civil Liberties Union et al., of the
conflict between the proposed "Domestic Security Act of 2003" and civil liberties).
11. Compare Shenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (affirming the conviction of an anti-war
pamphleteer, holding that the distribution of anti-war materials during time of war constituted a "clear
and present danger"), with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (upholding the right ofa Ku Klux
Klansman to advocate violence, holding per curiam, that for such advocacy to constitute a "clear and
present danger" it must be "likely to incite or produce such action").
12. In this article, the words "anti-biotic" and "antibiotic" mean different things. "Anti-biotic"
refers to any medical countermeasure to a biological agent, introduced into the person. "Antibiotic"
refers strictly to medicines with an anti-bacterial effect. Thus, an antibiotic is necessarily an anti-biotic,
but an anti-viral anti-biotic substance would not necessarily be an antibiotic. Countermeasures such as
quarantine control a biological agent vector, and involve the containment and isolation of an afflicted
person. Such physical countermeasures are not anti-biotic.
13. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.00315 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 362002 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12-2.1 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2004).
14. MSEHPA, supra note 2.
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Maryland's statutory text clearly reflects the influence of the MSEHPA, yet
portions of the Maryland statute differ greatly from the MSEHPA, particularly in
sections where the definition and placement of specific governmental powers bears
directly on constitutional due process considerations concerning the taking of life,
liberty, and property. 15 In reaction to these sections, the MSEHPA has received
16
much criticism from various policy advocates.
Both statutes define the extent of state police powers in a public health
emergency; however, an analysis of the language in both texts relating to
acquisition of private property by the state, 17 and compulsory vaccination and/or
quarantine, 18 reveals procedural requirements in the Maryland statute providing
enhanced access to legal representation, as well as compensatory restitution for
property damage resulting from the exercise of state police powers in the event of a
declared emergency. 19

III. SEPTEMBER 11TH AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MSEHPA

The collection of values that composes the American political will underwent
a radical transformation in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11 th,
2001, and the subsequent anthrax and ricin incidents. 20 Legislators heard an

15. Compare MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, §§ 14-3A-04 to 14-3A-05 (Supp. 2004) (detailing
requirements and procedures for isolation and quarantine during an emergency), with MSEHPA, supra
note 2, art. V (same).
16. See generally AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU), Q & A ON THE MODEL STATE
EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT, at http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID= 13471 &c=27 (last
visited Feb. 22, 2005) (describing the MSEHPA as "replete with civil liberties problems"); AMERICAN
LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL (ALEC), How WILL NEW PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURE AFFECT CIVIL

LIBERTIES, http://www.alec.org/viewpage.cfm?id=2150&versid=2651&xsectionid=101&dosrch=l (last
visited Feb. 22, 2005) (stating that the MSEHPA would grant governors "unchecked" power to declare
an emergency). But see Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act:
Planningfor and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 JAMA
622, 627 (2002) (arguing against criticisms of the MSEHPA).
17. Compare MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, §§ 14-308 (2003) ("The State shall repair or replace
any equipment, facilities, or property that is damaged while being used in accordance with the
proclamation of a state of emergency."), with MSEHPA, supranote 2, § 506 ("Compensation shall not
be provided for facilities or materials that are closed, evacuated, decontaminated, or destroyed when
there is reasonable cause to believe that they may endanger public health .... ").
18. Compare MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, §§ 14-3A-05(b)(1)(vi) (Supp. 2004) ("The directive
shall specify ... the availability of a hearing to contest the directive."), with MSEHPA, supra note 2, §
605(a)(2) ("The directive shall specify ... a copy of Article 6 and relevant definitions of the Act.").
The section of the Maryland statute is entitled "Directive for isolation and quarantine - Contents and
notice," while the MSEHPA § 605(a) title is "Temporary isolation and quarantine without notice." Id.
19. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
20. See Editorial, Ricin As a Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2004, at A24 (commenting that ricin
attacks are a "sobering reminder" that the United States remains vulnerable); Todd S. Purdum & Robin
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unprecedented call from the polity for governmental action to enhance national
security.
State and federal legislators immediately began the process of drafting
legislation. 2' Concurrently, non-governmental, academic, and policy think-tank
organizations began analyses on the issues of how to best contain, control, and
supply assistance to an affected population in response to a domestic terrorist
biological attack.22
Largely in response to the events of 2001, the Center for Law and the
Public's Health (CLPH) 23 appointed professor Lawrence Gostin to produce a draft
of Model Emergency Powers legislation, which defines and grants specific police
powers in the executive branch of a bicameral model state government. 24 These
powers include, inter alia, the power to appropriate, control, decontaminate, and if
deemed necessary, to destroy private property,25 and to involuntarily quarantine
individuals or groups of persons without notice.26 The MSEHPA explicitly states

Toner, A Day of Terror: The Federal Government; Driven Underground, Administration and
Congressional Officials Stay on the Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A5 (quoting Senator Sam
Brownback of Kansas as stating, "It's just shocking," following the September 1 th attack); Shankar
Vedantam, N.J. Case Could Be Linked to Spores in Mail; if Cross ContaminationIs Cause, Thousands
of Mail Recipients Could Be at Risk of Exposure, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2001, at A 15 (quoting Bradley
Perkins of the CDC as stating, "We will remain on high alert, high vigilance").
21. E.g., S. 5841, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (New York bill proposing state emergency powers); see
also Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Says Congress Should Treat Administration Proposal Carefully;
Says Many Provisions Go Far Beyond Anti-Terrorism Needs (Sept. 20, 2001) (detailing legislation that
was introduced following the September 11 th attack), at http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/National
Security.cfm?ID=9757&c=24 (last visited Feb. 22, 2005); Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Says Safety
and Freedom Compatible; Calls on Congress to Reject Bills that Go Far Beyond Anti-Terrorism Needs
(Oct. 2, 2001) (detailing provisions of "compromise" legislation that was introduced following the
September 11 th attack), at http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfmtD=9779&c=24
(last visisted Jan. 27, 2005).
22. E.g., Joseph Barbera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in the
United States: Scientific Examination, Logistic and Legal Limits, and Possible Consequences, 286
JAMA 2711, 2713-15 (2001); ACLU, supra note 16 (surveying, inter alia, intra- and extragovernmental responses to the attacks).
23. Under the auspices and authorization of the federally administered Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), the Center for Law and the Public's Health (CLPH) was founded in 2000 as an
information clearing house for health law information. CENTER FOR LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH
(CLPH), WELCOME TO THE CENTER FOR LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH, at http://www.publichealth

law.net/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
24. MSEHPA, supra note 2, at 1; see also Jason W. Sapsin, Introduction to Emergency Public
Health Law for Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 387, 387 (2002)
(noting that the MSEHPA, or Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, was submitted in draft form
on December 21, 2001); Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act:
Planningfor and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally OccurringInfectious Diseases, 288 JAMA
622 (2002) (explaining the various powers assigned to governors and their executive agencies under the
MSEHPA). Many states passed legislation based largely on the language of the initial draft. Id. at 622
(stating that thirty-four states have introduced legislation based on the MSEHPA).
25. MSEHPA, supra note 2, art. V.
26. Id. art. VI.

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 8:1:185

as a policy goal the proper attention that such a statute must give to questions of
due process.2 The MSEHPA tries to balance the preservation of civil liberties
with the need for rapid, overwhelming governmental response to contain the
damage of a catastrophic public health event, such as an NBC attack.
For example, in an attempt to address due process concerns, Gostin explains
the MSEHPA language regarding takings:
Coercive powers are the most controversial aspects of any legal system.
Nevertheless, they may be necessary to manage property or protect
persons in a public health emergency. There are numerous
circumstances that might require management of property in a public
health emergency - e.g., shortages of vaccines, medicines, hospital beds,
or facilities for disposal of corpses. It may even be necessary to close
facilities or destroy property that is contaminated or dangerous. Even in
the case of a relatively small outbreak, such as the recent anthrax
attacks, the government considered the need to compulsorily license
proprietary medications and destroy contaminated facilities. The law
must provide authority, with fair safeguards, to manage property that is
needed to contain a serious health threat.28
Gostin agrees that there needs to be a balancing of apposite interests,
explaining: "Provided [governmental] powers are bounded by legal safeguards,
individuals should be required to yield some of their autonomy, liberty or property
to protect the health and security of the community." 29 But, despite such analysis,
an important question remains unanswered: What constitutes a "legal safeguard" in
the MSEHPA for those three species of constitutionally protected interestsautonomy, liberty, and property?
Before the government takes a person's life, liberty or property, it must
provide due process of law. This requirement is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.3 0 The amendment requires that the taking be for
public use,3 ' and that any such taking be justly compensated. 2 These protections
were specifically extended to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment in some of
the earliest United States Supreme Court cases where such an application was at

27. Id.§ 102 (finding that individual rights "must be respected to the fullest extent possible

consistent with maintaining and preserving the public's health and safety."); see also Lawrence 0.
Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public Health and Civil Liberties in a Time of
Terrorism, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 31 (2003) (quoting and discussing the question of due process in the
MSEHPA).

28. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
29. Id.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31. Id.

32. Id.
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issue. 3 3 The MSEHPA dictates what process is due for the taking of liberty
through state police powers of mass quarantine; bodily autonomy through state
police powers of coercive mass vaccination; and property via the taking of, and
possible destruction of, privately owned property without any compensation or
judicial recourse.34 A due process analysis of the MSEHPA provisions for the
governmental taking of property and liberty in a declared emergency requires an
initial examination of the role of the judiciary provided in the MSEHPA.

IV. OVERVIEW OF THE

MSEHPA

AND THE MARYLAND EMERGENCY POWERS ACT

The police powers defined in the MSEHPA have been widely criticized from
various policy advocates 35 because the powers extend to the limits of personal
property, liberty and bodily integrity interests.36
Similarly, the Maryland
catastrophic emergency statute vests extraordinary coercive power in the
Governor.37 Both documents attempt to balance and preserve the vital interests
protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, while protecting citizens from
a catastrophic attack.
Initially, the MSEHPA establishes the power to quarantine a citizen forcibly
once the governor has declared the Emergency Powers Act effective.38 The
declaration may only be overturned by a majority vote of both houses of the
legislature.39 Significantly, no provision is made for judicial review of the
declaration. 4° Non-governmental policy organizations have criticized the absence
of such a review, without which the state executive could impose the full police

33. E.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). The Court in this
opinion held:
In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by statute,
whereby private property is taken for the State or under its direction for public use,
without compensation made or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority,
wanting in the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, and the affirmance of such judgment by the highest
court of the State is a denial by that State of a right secured to the owner by that
instrument.
Id. at 241.
34. MSEHPA, supra note 2, §§ 602-05, 402.
35. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
38. MSEHPA, supra note 2, §§ 401-403,604.
39. Id. § 405(c).
40. Id. art. IV.
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powers of the MSEHPA. 4 1 Specifically, with reference to the citizen's right to a
hearing in the event of a forcible quarantine, that citizen can be quarantined
without notice, "through a written directive if delay in imposing the isolation or
quarantine would significantly jeopardize the public health authority's ability to
prevent or limit the transmission of a contagious or possibly contagious disease to
others." 42 Such an example of extreme police power is strengthened in the
MSEHPA because a legislature may only overrule an executive invocation of
MSEHPA police powers by a majority vote of each house of a bicameral
legislature.43
The provisions for confiscating property under the MSEHPA have been
criticized as lacking sufficiently timely judicial oversight." The MSEHPA grants
the executive the power to confiscate, decontaminate, and even destroy property
45
and human remains, without compensation, during a declared emergency.
Judicial recourse, again, is not provided in the MSEHPA until 10 days after the
taking has occurred4 6 At that point, the public health authority must apply for a
court order justifying the taking.47 Certainly the state can make a convincing
argument that property rife with contagion affects a compelling governmental
interest in preventing and controlling an epidemic, regardless of any causative ill
intent. This prevention and control would, under this line of reasoning, constitute a
"public use."
Maryland enacted legislation in 2001 that was based in part on the
MSEHPA. 48 The Maryland statute substantially differs from the MSEHPA with
respect to specific due process considerations of quarantine, confiscation, and
destruction of private property, as well as the apportionment of executive power specifically the level within the executive branch that declares and manages a
"catastrophic health emergency." 49 The balance of this article examines the
takings, coercive vaccination, and quarantine provisions of both the MSEHPA and

41. E.g., ACLU, supra note 16 (decrying the MSEHPA for its failure to supply checks on the grant
of power to the executive).
42. MSEHPA, supra note 2, § 605(a)(1).
43. Id. § 405(c). Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature (colloquially called the 'Unicam'),
would thus require a structural modification of the model. NEB. CONST. art. Ill, § 1. Nebraska's current
emergency management statute was passed in 1996. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-829.36 et seq. (1996).
44. E.g., ACLU, supra note 16.

45. MSEHPA, supranote 2, art. V.
46. Id. § 605(a)(4).
47. Id.
48. MD. CODE ANN., art. 41 §§ 2-201 to 2-204 (West 2003) (repealed 2004). This legislation was
recodified in 2004 and is now located at MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, §§ 14-101 to 14-3A-08 (2003
& Supp. 2004).

49. Id. § 14-3A-02(a). The Maryland Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) makes
primary administrative decisions, while the governor retains power above the commissioner throughout
the "catastrophic health emergency" to overrule the commissioner's decisions. Id. § 14-3A-03.
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the Maryland emergency powers statutes, and compares constitutional "takings"
and due process analyses of the Maryland law to the MSEHPA. The scope of this
comparison encompasses contemporary considerations of substantive due process,
as guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, and as shaped by case law.

V. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT ANALYSIS

State governmental action in defense and furtherance of the public welfare is
a substantive exercise of a state's police power. 50 It has been generally understood
that the police power is an 'inherent power' to regulate, existing in a state
government. 5 1 The federal constitutional limits to a state's ability to exercise its
police power are, as the United States Supreme Court's holdings have addressed,
governed by the following factors:
52
1) Does the regulation amount to an unconstitutional "taking?,
2) Does the regulation violate constitutional substantive due process
53
guarantees?
54
3) Does the regulation violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection?
4) Does the regulation violate the constitutional protections of freedom of
speech? 55
5) Does the regulation violate the constitutional protections of freedom of
56
religion?
The first two questions are relevant to the issue under consideration. In
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,57 the United States Supreme Court
recognized only two circumstances of categorical unconstitutionality under the
takings clause: 1) a regulation that compels physical invasion of the property; and
2) a regulation that denies "all economically beneficial or productive use of the

50. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 658-59 (1887); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, Co., 272
U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
51. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY, § 9.2, at 519 (3d ed.

2000).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The "takings clause" states, "[N]or shall [I] private property be [2]
taken for [3] public use without [4] just compensation." Id.(ordinal divisions and emphasis added).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .. ."Id.
54. Id., "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Id.
55. U.S. CONST.

amend. I.

56. Id.
57. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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land." 58
Commentators have interpreted these holdings to effectuate a
subordination of the "takings" clause within the analysis of due process:
"Governments may exercise their police powers only to preserve the public health,
safety and welfare." 59 The unresolved constitutional issue regarding the taking of
property in the MSEHPA is: What constitutionally protected interests should
prevail when a public use intended to preserve public health, safety and welfare,
namely the uncompensated destruction of contaminated property, requires physical
invasion and defeats all economic benefit and production attendant to that
property?
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that, "No
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.,, 60 This amendment imposes both substantive and procedural requirements
upon the federal government that must be met before a "taking" can occur.6 1 The
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, echoed in the Fourteenth Amendment,
states, "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . ."62 The Supreme Court held that, "Once it is
decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice, the same constitutional standards apply against both the state
63
and federal governments."
Thus, state action is governed by due process restrictions imposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 64 In practice, these restrictions have varied widely in their
effects throughout their history. For example, the forced removal of JapaneseAmericans from freedom to internment camps during World War II stands as
tragic evidence of the willingness of the government to undermine or ignore basic
constitutional protections during times of national duress. 65 Former United States
Supreme Court Justice Thomas C. Clark referred to this incident when he stated:
The truth is - as this deplorable experience proves - that constitutions
and laws are not sufficient of themselves .... Despite the unequivocal
language of the Constitution of the United States that the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended, and despite the Fifth Amendment's

58. Id. at 1015.
59. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 51, § 9.4, at 528.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
61. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 51, § 9.2, at 521 (discussing that the limitations to the
federal and state powers to regulate land use are found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and are
"namely the guarantees against eminent domain 'takings' without compensation, against denial of 'due
process of law,' and of equal protection of law.").
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
63. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
65. See Tom C. Clark, Epilogue to MAISIE & RICHARD CONRAT, EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066 110-111
(1972) (discussing constitutional provisions that were denied to Japanese-Americans during World War
11through Executive Order 9066).
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command that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, both of these constitutional safeguards were
denied by military action under Executive Order 9066.66
More recently, during the administration of President William Jefferson
Clinton, scientist Wen Ho Lee was arrested and imprisoned in solitary confinement
while administration attorneys attempted to deny Lee judicial recourse, purportedly
for reasons of national security.67 Similarly, in 2004 the Supreme Court heard the
case of Jose Padilla, an American citizen held as an enemy combatant since 2002,
under suspicions that he was involved in a plot to detonate a radioactive "dirty
bomb" in the United States.68 Padilla was held without a hearing, without access
to counsel, and without being indicted or charged with a crime for almost two
years before the United States district court overruled the executive actions and
restored his basic constitutional right to the counsel that then pursued his case to
the Supreme Court.69 Still in custody almost three years after his arrest, Mr.
Padilla met with his counsel for the first time in January, 2005.
Padilla's case
may represent the strongest example yet of the conflicts of interest at the due
process balance point.
The government interest in preventing anyone from detonating a dirty bomb
is surely "provid[ing] for the common defense" of its citizens, to quote a primary
purpose of American constitutional government listed in the preamble to the
Constitution. 7 1 Yet the government is also rightly restricted by the scope of its
police powers under the Constitution, and is especially limited by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments in ways that may materially impair its ability to prevent
the detonation of dirty bombs. Which constitutional interest should prevail:
providing for the common defense or due process? And, how should legislation
prospectively avoid creating multiple constitutional crises resulting from
unresolved conflicts such as those in Mr. Padilla's case? Avoidance of such
constitutional conflicts is crucial, for they may arise not during such relatively
sedate contexts as a presidential election, but during the context of an unfolding

66. Id.
67. WEN Ho LEE & HELEN ZIA, MY COUNTRY VERSUS ME (2001) (account by the Los Alamos

scientist who was falsely accused of being a spy for a foreign government).
68. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). The Court did not reach the due process
question, remanding the case to the district court for reasons of jurisdictional technicalities.
Specifically, the Court held that the habeas petition filed on Mr. Padilla's behalf by his counsel was
filed in a court lacking personal jurisdiction over Mr. Padilla's immediate custodian, the commander of
the Brig on which he had been held since his arrest on May 8, 2002. Id. at 2715.
69. Id.
70. Joan Ryan, Not All Citizens Have Rights, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Jan. 13, 2005, at B 1.
71. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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national catastrophe. Creating a model that avoids these conflicts was among the
core considerations involved in the drafting of the MSEHPA.72

VI. THE

STRUCTURE AND PROVISIONS OF THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH

POWERS ACT

In its preamble, the MSEHPA states:
During a public health emergency, state and local officials are
authorized to use and appropriate property as necessary for the care,
treatment, and housing of patients, and to destroy contaminated facilites
or materials.

They are also empowered to . . . separate affected

individuals from the population at large to interrupt disease
transmission.
At the same time, the Act recognizes that a state's ability to respond
to a public health emergency must respect the dignity and rights of
73
persons."
The preamble of the MSEHPA concludes by asserting that, aside from the
importance of optimizing response during a health emergency, a goal of the Model
Act is the overall improvement of the public health system.74
The MSEHPA contains a preamble and eight articles.75 Certain sections of
the Act provide for emergency governmental powers to acquire, condemn, destroy,
or otherwise utilize private property in the course of addressing a public health
emergency. 76 Several of the legislative findings and definitions included in the
opening sections of the model statute bear directly upon the due process analysis of
the Model Act. Article I, section 102(b) states the legislative finding that, "[n]ew
and emerging dangers - including emergent and resurgent infectious diseases and
incidents of civilian mass casualties - pose serious and immediate threats. 77
Article I, section 102(i) finds that, "[t]he rights of the people to liberty, bodily

72. See Gostin, supra note 27, at 20-21 (expressing the desire for the MSEHPA not to "contain

radical new powers that posed a threat to civil liberties").
73. MSEHPA, supra note 2, pmbl.
74. Id.
75. The MSEHPA consists of the Preamble; Art. 1, Title, Findings Purposes, and Definitions; Art.
2, Planning For A Public Health Emergency; Art. 3, Measures To Detect and Track Public Health
Emergencies; Art. 4, Declaring A State Of Public Health Emergency; Art. 5, Special Powers During A
State Of Public Health Emergency: Management of Property; Art. 6, Special Powers During A State of
Public Health Emergency: Protection of Persons; Art. 7, Public Information Regarding Public Health
Emergency; Art 8, Misc. MSEHPA, supra note 2, at 2-5.
76. See MSEHPA, supra note 2, § 501-507 (discussing special powers during a public health
emergency pertaining to the management of property).
77. Id. § 102(b).
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integrity, and privacy must be respected to the fullest extent possible consistent
with maintaining and preserving the public's health and security." 78 The structure
of the previous finding reflects the relationship between rights of liberty and
property on the one hand, and providing for the common defense on the other.
Liberty, and even bodily integrity, is clearly subject to the predicated need to
preserve public health - a core aspect of any common defense. Section 1020)
declares the legislation necessary to protect the safety of the citizens of the state.79
The MSEHPA, through the doctrine of necessity, establishes the primacy of
common defense interests of the state over the due process rights of citizens in the
event of a health emergency.
The MSEHPA also defines the types of emergencies that warrant an
invocation of the Emergency Powers. Article 1, Section 104(m) defines the term
"public health emergency" as follows:
A "public health emergency" is an occurrence or imminent threat of an
illness or health condition that:
(1) is believed to be caused by any of the following:
(i) bioterrorism;
(ii) the appearance of a novel or previously controlled or
eradicated infectious agent or biological toxin; and
(2) poses a high probability of any of the following harms:
(i) a large number of deaths in the affected population;
(ii) a large number of serious or long-term disabilities in the
affected population; or
(iii) widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent
that poses a significant risk of substantial future 80harm to a
large number of people in the affected population.
When one of these triggering events occurs, the governor of the state can
declare a "State of Public Health Emergency," under Article IV, section 401 .8 A
proper execution of the order under the direction of section 402 invokes broad and
comprehensive executive powers. Under a state of Public Health Emergency, a
governor may suspend any regulatory statute prescribing procedures for
conducting state business, 82 or any order, or rule of a state agency, limited by the
provision that such power may be invoked only to the extent that such an exercise
83
prevents the regulation or order from hindering the public health response.

78. Id. § 102(i).
79. Id.§ 1020).
80. MSEH PA, supra note 2, § 104(m).

81. Id. § 401.
82. Id. § 403(a)(1).
83. Id.
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The MSEHPA provides three methods of terminating an executive order: 1)
explicit termination by the Governor; 2) automatic termination after thirty days
unless the governor renews under the identical terms set forth for the original
84
declaration; or 3) a majority vote of both chambers of the state legislature.
declaration upon a
Legislative termination may occur at any time after the original
85
finding that the public health emergency no longer exists.
When the governor makes the declaration, extensive special powers vest in
the public health authority. 86 That authority may close, evacuate, decontaminate,
or destroy any material "of which there is reasonable cause to believe that it may
endanger the public health. 87 The public health authority may procure, "by
or otherwise, ,,88 any material and/or facility "reasonable and
condemnation
''
necessary 89 to respond to the public health emergency, with the right to take
9

immediate possession. 0
Similar taking powers apply to actions pursuant to disposal of waste, because
the MSEHPA grants the public health authority the power to immediately
confiscate disposal facilities, landfills, private businesses involved in waste
disposal, and to compel storage or use of facilities for disposal or storage of
contaminated materials. 9i Again, this power is limited by the requirement that
92
these takings be reasonable and necessary in order to respond to the emergency.
The MSEHPA mandates that takings be justly compensated, but that provision
expressly excludes compensation "for facilities or materials that are closed,
evacuated, decontaminated, or destroyed when there is reasonable cause to believe
that they may endanger the public health .... Section 507 provides that civil
proceedings be instituted in relation to the destruction of property, "[t]o the extent
practicable consistent with the protection of public health ....94
With respect to the liberty and autonomy of persons, the MSEHPA vests in
the public health agency powers of coercive quarantine and vaccination, with lack
of cooperation constituting a misdemeanor. 95 The public health authority may
96
immediately institute temporary quarantine without notice, by written directive.

84. Id. § 405(a)-(c).
85. Id. § 405(c).
86. MSEHPA, supra note 2, §§ 501-507.
87. Id. § 501.
88. Id. § 502(a).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.§ 503(b)-(c).
92. MSEHPA, supra note 2, § 503(c).
93. Id. § 506. As an uncompensated, destructive taking is most certainly a permanent taking, such
a construction is contrary to U.S. CONST. amend. V.
94. Id.§ 507.
95. Id.§§ 603, 604(a) and (c).
96. Id.§ 605(a)(1).
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The individual or group quarantined gets a copy of the directive.97 To continue the
quarantine, the public health authority must file a petition for a court order within
ten days after first instituting the quarantine. 98 This process is called "temporary
99
isolation and quarantine without notice."
While the quarantined person may file a petition for an order to show cause
why that person should not be released, 00 a hearing on this petition can be delayed
indefinitely.' 0' To justify a delay, the state must show that there is good cause for
the delay, and that the circumstances are extraordinary. 10 2 Persons and groups do
have the right to court-appointed counsel, but multiple claims may be
consolidated. 10 3 The public health authority may also gain access to protected
health information, "to . . . conduct epidemiologic research, or . . . investigate
causes of transmission."'0(4 Such statutory provisions illustrate the broad scope of
the MSEHPA's power to deprive persons of liberty and property.

VII. REACTIONS
Commentary and criticism about the MSEHPA appeared almost immediately
subsequent to its release in December 2001.I°5 Tellingly, criticism emanated with

97. Id. § 605(a)(3).
98. MSEHPA, supra note 2, § 605(a)(4).
99. Id. § 605(a).
100. Id. § 605 (c)(l).
101. Id. § 605 (c)(3). It is unclear how "extraordinary circumstances" could not be present in the
context of a declared emergency.
102. Id. Compare the sequence of events described here (quarantine, followed by a possible
hearing) with the due process requirements attendant to involuntary commitment (for medical
treatment) of a convicted felon established in Vitek v. Jones:
[A]mong the historic liberties protected by the Due Process Clause is the 'right to be
free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security.'
We conclude that a convicted felon [is] entitled to the benefit of procedures appropriate
in the circumstances before he [is] transferred . . . . These minimum requirements
being a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may
have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for the determination of
the preconditions to adverse official action.
445 U.S 480, 492-93 (1980) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). It is unreasonable to assume that the
liberty due process interests of the ordinary citizen do not reach those of the convicted felon.
103. MSEHPA, supra note 2, §605(d)(l)-(2).
104. Id. § 607(a).
105. E.g., Sharon Lerner, A New Health-Emergency Law Raises Concerns for the Immune
Compromised- Round Up the Unusual Suspects, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 2, 2002 (arguing that the
MSEHPA provides insufficient consideration of the potential for harm to immune-suppressed persons,
that the percentage of persons in the United States that are immune-suppressed is ever-increasing, and
that, historically, forced vaccination has resulted in disproportionate harm to such persons),
http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0201/lemer.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2005); JENNIFER KING,
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comparable fervor from non-governmental policy advocacy organizations on both
the left and the right of the traditional political spectrum. Jennifer King, in a policy
critique written for the conservative American Legislative Exchange Council,
criticized the MSEHPA as being impermissibly vague in its definitions for a statute
that grants such plenary power to the executive: ".

.

. words such as 'substantial'

and 'significant' are not defined in this legislation, but 'infectious disease' is
defined as a disease caused by a living organism." 10 6 King also criticizes the
statute as unnecessary and duplicative, explaining that "governors already have the
power to declare a state of emergency .... ,,107 Definitions of such breadth
arguably could subject precedent executive emergency powers to new and wholly
unpredictable judicial interpretation.
King expresses her greatest alarm about the provisions of the MSEHPA
concerning confiscation and rationing of personal property, calling these
provisions, "Perhaps the most dangerous and unprecedented provisions of the
0
M[S]EHPA."'
Sharon Lerner, writing for The Village Voice, recounts the 1947 New York
City smallpox outbreak, during which the vaccination program caused more deaths
than the smallpox.'0 9 Her article quotes Donna Lieberman of the New York Civil
Liberties Union, who described the MSEHPA as, "[A] recipe for discriminatory
application ....

We are concerned that emergency powers will be used to target

minority groups, whether they be gays or people of color or those perceived to be
most at risk of infection."" 0 Lieberman's harshest criticisms assert that the very
policy of quarantine as a method of infectious disease control has been discredited
by MSEHPA author Gostin himself."'

AMERICAN

LEGISLATIVE

EXCHANGE

COUNCIL,

POWER

GRAB:

THE

STATES

IN

A

STATE

OF

EMERGENCY: THE MODEL HEALTH EMERGENCY POWERS ACT, (Jan. 2002) (arguing, inter alia, that the

unlimited power of the executive branch is not sufficiently checked by judicial oversight),
http://www.alec.org/meSWFiles/pdf/0202.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2005); Julie Bruce, Bioterrorism
Meets Privacy: An Analysis of the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act and the HIPAA Privacy
Rule, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 75 (2003) (raising concerns about conflicts between federal medical
privacy statutes and the MSEHPA provision for the public health authority's access to protected
medical information).
106. King, supra note 105, at 1.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id.
109. Lerner, supra note 105.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.; see also Barbera et al., supra note 22, at 2711. In Barbera's article, co-authored by
Professor Gostin, the main thesis is: "Imposition of large-scale quarantine - compulsory sequestration
of groups of possibly exposed persons or human confinement within certain geographic areas to prevent
spread of contagious disease - should not be considered a primary public health strategy in most
imaginable circumstances."
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Furthermore, critics charge that coercive vaccination under the MSEHPA
would prove fatal to a large portion of the immune-deficient population."12 Lerner
quotes Tanya Ehrmann, Director of Public Policy for AIDS Action in Washington
D.C., regarding the prospect of group quarantine and forced vaccination: "This
isn't a situation in which people are unwilling to comply with a requirement ....
It's that the vaccine would kill us. What are we supposed to do?"' 3
Lerner's critique of the effectiveness of quarantine also cites the primary
drafter of the MSEHPA, Professor Gostin himself, as providing the most cutting
criticism of the plausibility of a quarantine procedure: "It is probable that a
population exposed to a biological weapon will have dispersed well beyond any
easily definable geographic boundaries before the infection becomes manifest and
any disease containment measures can be initiated." ' 1 4 The evaluation of inflicted
harm through vaccination, to be a complete analysis, must consider the alternative
of a large disease vector in the absence of vaccination.' 15 Such analysis is not
found in Lerner's article.
Professor Wendy Parmet has strongly criticized the quarantine powers and
the vague, broad domains of their potency."l 6 Under Parmet's reading of the
MSEHPA, the Model Act potentially grants the power to quarantine persons with
HIV, for an indeterminate period of time, in a smallpox based attack, without any
prior notice." 17 Parmet surmises that the inability of immune-deficient persons to
be immunized for smallpox could, in such an event, be argued as a reasonable
basis for such wholesale quarantine of a sizeable class of citizens. 118 Exposure of
immune-deficient persons to persons infected but not presenting symptoms could
present a high probability of infection, by virtue of their deficiency of resistance to

112. Lerner, supra note 105.
113. Id.
114. Id.(quoting Barbara et al.,
supra note 22, at 2714).
115. See infra notes 143-152 and accompanying text (discussing the 1947 Smallpox outbreak).
116. Wendy E. Parmet, Quarantine Redux: Bioterrorism, AIDS and the Curtailment of Individual
Liberty in the Name ofPublic Health, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 85, 111 (2003).

117. Id. at 93-97. Parmet constructs her hypothetical around MSEHPA art. VI, § 604, allowing for
the indefinite quarantine of "an individual or groups of individuals." This includes individuals or
groups of individuals "who have not been vaccinated, treated, tested, or examined ....IId. § 604(a). §
605(a) continues, "The public health authority may temporarily isolate or quarantine an individual or
groups of individuals ... if delay in imposing the isolation or quarantine would significantly jeopardize
the public health authority's ability to prevent or limit the transmission of a contagious or possibly
contagious disease to others." The thrust of Parmet's argument is that, under the foregoing language, it
is reasonable that persons with HIV could be construed as a group warranting quarantine, because these
persons would not be vaccinated due to the vaccine's tendency to attack their weak immune systems;
thus, they would be contagious. See id.
118. Id.at 93-94.
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infection. Quarantine, therefore, could foreseeably cause the deaths of quarantined
immune-deficient persons, that might not have been otherwise. 1 9
Perhaps most chilling is a direct quotation from a 1987 article by MSEHPA
drafter Gostin, who wrote:
There is some public support for restricting the liberty and autonomy of
HIV-infected people. In five national public opinion polls conducted
between September 1985 and November 1986, 28 to 54 percent of the
respondents favored 'quarantine' of people with
AIDS in 'special places
20
to keep them away from the general public.' 1
Criticism and analysis of the MSEHPA in academic journals has reflected
similar concerns, focusing mainly on privacy concerns. 121 These criticisms seem
to have had little effect on adoption of the Model Act as the basis for actual
legislation. In the months following the release of the MSEHPA, several state
legislatures considered the Model Act in their deliberations on Emergency Health
Powers legislation. 122 By July 2002, seven states had passed portions of the
MSEHPA, including Maryland. 123 Eleven states had rejected or shelved the
legislation, while most of the remaining states had passed legislation intended to
124
deal with a catastrophic health emergency that had no connection to the Model.

119. Lemer, supra note 105. Immune-deficient persons are also necessarily contra-indicated for
vaccination, as vaccination, a priori, is an intrusion upon and leveraging of the immune system to
prevent infection. Such prophylaxes hold the high probability of accelerating the deaths of immunedeficient.
120. Parmet, supra note 116, at 95-96 (quoting Larry Gostin & Andrew Ziegler, A Review ofAIDSRelated Legislative and Regulatory Policy in the United States, 15 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 5, 11
(1987)).
121. E.g., Bruce, supra note 105, at 79-88 (posing numerous hypothetical concerns regarding the
interaction of the MSEHPA provision for medical information access and the federal HIPAA
provisions); see also Lorena Matei, Quarantine Revision and the Model State Emergency Health
Powers Act: "Laws for the Common Good," 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 433
(2002) (detailing the origins of the MSEHPA and examining the problems attendant to quarantine,
while presenting the standardization of quarantine procedures through the MSEHPA as ineffective).
122. See generally Memorandum from Andrew Schlafly, General Counsel, Association of
American Physicians and Surgeons (outlining the first seven states to enact portions of the MSEHPA)
http://www.aapsonline.org/testimony/emerpower2.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2005); see also THE
CENTER FOR LAW & THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH (CLPH), THE MODEL SATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS
ACT: STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY (July 1, 2004) (noting that forty-three states have introduced or
passed legislation based in whole or in part on the MSEHPA), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/
MSEHPA/MSEHPALegisActivity.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
123. Memorandum from Andrew Schlafly, supra note 122.
124. Id.
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THE RELATION OF THE MARYLAND EMERGENCY POWERS LEGISLATION TO
THE

MSEHPA

The Maryland legislation dealing with the subjects addressed by and partially
derived from the MSEHPA became law in the state of Maryland on April 9, 2002 25
less than five months after the release of the amended draft of the MSEHPA.
The Maryland Act differs from the MSEHPA in three crucial aspects: 1) the
structure of the definitions attempts to address concerns of vagueness in the
MSEHPA; 2) the structural modifications in the Maryland Act incorporate existing
Maryland emergency management agency planning systems; and 3) procedures
and explicit limitations of term and scope of the executive powers of taking and
126
quarantine are far more detailed and thorough in their drafting.
The Maryland Act, even with these enhancements, has been the subject of
criticism. Center for Health and Homeland Security Director and University of
Maryland School of Law Professor Michael Greenberger offered this comment on
the Maryland statute: "I don't think anybody understands just how draconian it
could be if put in the wrong hands."' 127 Yet the due process safeguards written into
the Maryland law are substantially more secure than those drafted in the MSEHPA.
The initial clue to the differences between the MSEHPA and the Maryland
statute is that the state of emergency declared in each is labeled in very different
ways.
Whereas the MSEHPA labels such a state as a "public health
emergency,"' 128 the Maryland statute labels it as a "catastrophic health
emergency. ' 29 The MSEHPA defines a "public health emergency" as "an
occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition."' 130 Maryland
defines "catastrophic health emergency" as an imminent threat of extensive loss of
life or of serious disability caused by exposure to a deadly agent."' 131 "Deadly
125. Letter from Karl S. Amo, Executive Director, Md. Dep't of Leg. Servs., to the Members of the
(Maryland) General Assembly (2002) (listing the bills signed and vetoed by Governor Parris N.
Glendening following the 2002 Session of the General Assembly. This letter lists S.B. 234,
Catastrophic Health Emergencies - Powers of the Governor and the Secretary of Health and Mental
Hygiene,
as
the
first
bill
signed
by
the
governor),
available
at
http://mlis.state.md.us/2002rs/Signings/signed.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
126. Compare MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 202(c)(1) (2003) ("The Governor shall rescind a
proclamation issued under this section whenever the Governor determines that the catastrophic health
emergency no longer exists"), with MSEHPA, supra note 2, § 402(d) (requiring the term of the
emergency to be included in the initial declaration: "A state of public health emergency shall be
declared by an executive order which specifies . . .the duration of the state of the public health
emergency, if less than 30 days ....
").
127. Brian M. Schleter, Public Safety, Civil Liberties Often at Odds in Terror War, THE CAPITAL
(Annapolis, Md.), Sept. 6, 2002, at Al.
128. MSEHPA, supra note 2, § 104(m).
129. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, §14-3A-01 (b) (Supp. 2004).
130. MSEHPA, supranote 2, § 104(m).
13 1. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 14-3A-0 I (Supp. 2004).

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 8:1:185

agent" in the Maryland statute occupies the same position as "bioterrorism" in the
MSEHPA. The MSEHPA definition includes a general and comprehensively
inclusive list of agent-categories, while the Maryland definition provides detailed
guidance regarding what agents are included in the scope of the statute.
"Bioterrorism" is defined in the MSEHPA as, "the intentional use of any
microorganism, virus, infectious substance, or biological product that may be
engineered ...

in order to influence the conduct of government or to intimidate or

to coerce a civilian population.' 32 Maryland's definition of "deadly agent" makes
no reference to intent and defines it in terms of specific varieties of nuclear,
biological, and chemical materials. 33 For example, the MSEHPA definition
includes "any microorganism, virus, infectious substance, or biological
product .... 34 In contrast, the Maryland definition of "deadly agent," provides a
more explicit enumeration of subject conditions:
"Deadly agent means . .

.

(1) anthrax, ebola, plague, smallpox,

tularemia, or other bacterial, fungal, rickettsial, or viral agent, biological
toxin, or other biological agent capable of causing extensive loss of life
or serious disability; (2) mustard gas, nerve gas, or other chemical agent
capable of causing extensive loss of life or serious disability; or (3)
radiation at levels capable of causing extensive loss of life or serious
disability.' 35
The lack of reference to intent in the Maryland statute is, in the absence of a
detailed legislative historical record, likely to be the result of the necessary
integration of the emergency powers into a pre-existing statutory opus. This
omission of the intent requirement present in the MSEHPA definition of
bioterrorism provides more flexibility in the executive ability to invoke the powers
granted in section 14-3A-03 of the Maryland statute, which enumerates the extent
and nature of the health commissioner's police powers under the act.' 36 The
triggering event in the Maryland statute merely requires the presence of a deadly
agent regardless of the presence of intent. The powers granted to the governor
37
under Section 14-3A-03 parallel the powers granted in the MSEHPA.1
Under the Maryland statute, the governor makes a proclamation that then
vests power in the Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) secretary,
"or other designated official.' 38 Acquisition, rationing, stockpiling, coerced
cooperation of health care providers, price fixing, taking, quarantine, and coerced

132. MSEHPA, supra note 2, § 104(a).
133. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14-3A-01(c) (Supp. 2004).
134. MSEHPA, supra note 2, § 104(a).
135. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14-3A-01(c) (Supp. 2004).
136. Id. § 14-3A-03 (Supp. 2004).
137. Id.

138. Id.
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medical examination and vaccination are all discussed in the Maryland Act.1 39 In
the Maryland Act, special provisions are present with respect to vaccination that
differ both in structure and in content from the MSEHPA: "If medically necessary
and reasonable to treat, [the secretary or other designated official can] require the
individual to submit to vaccination or medical treatment."' 140 In the MSEHPA, the
language limiting the power of coercive vaccination requires only "necess[ity] to
address the public health emergency" regardless of any connection to medical
necessity. 141 The Maryland Act specifically requires, before coercive vaccination
is allowed, that a medical necessity exist in order to ". . . treat, prevent or reduce
the spread of the disease or outbreak."'' 42 The medical necessity language in the
Maryland Act addresses concerns of immune-deficient persons for whom a
smallpox vaccination could likely be far more deadly than for the general
population. Of course, the exception addressed in both provisions - the lack of
power to vaccinate all persons - raises equally serious concerns. If, in the modem
age of unprecedented personal mobility, the efficacy of quarantine is even lower
than its already suspect level, mass vaccination - even with substantial casualties
among the vaccinated population - may be the only possible method of stemming a
contagion. A strong argument can be made that the decisions regarding who must
be vaccinated are decisions that should not be prospectively restricted.
The efficacy of mass vaccination is evident when comparing historical
instances of mass vaccination and the resulting mortality rates with probable
mortality rates in a population where the contagion proceeds unchecked. In the
same 1947 New York City outbreak discussed above, the rapid and comprehensive
blanket vaccination program, which did in fact cause several vaccination-related
deaths, most likely prevented the deaths of tens of thousands of people. 143 The
span of that outbreak was roughly one calendar month.' 44 The disease vector
formed when a single smallpox carrier arrived from Mexico in late March 1947.145
The first three subsequent cases were reported on April 5.146 Within 48 hours,
hospitals in all five boroughs were vaccinating people 24 hours a day. 47 There
149
was no reported coercion. 148 By May 3, the outbreak was declared controlled.

139.
140.
141.
142.

See id. § 14-3A-03(b)(2).
Id. § 14-3A-03(b)(3).
MSEHPA, supra note 2, § 603(a).
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 14-3A-03(b)(3) (Supp. 2004).

143. Lemer, supra note 105; see also N. Gayed, Notes on an epidemic ofsmallpox in New York City
- 1947 and the ensuing mass vaccination (Aug. 30, 2000), at http://www.med.uiuc.edu/m2/

epidemiology/smallpox.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
144. See id. (reporting on events from April 5 to May 3, 1947).
145. Id

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id
See Gayed, supra note 143.
Id.
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In that time-span, over 6.3 million people had been vaccinated. 150 Of these, there

were four to eight vaccine related deaths, 151 producing a vaccination fatality rate of
0.016%. Smallpox, when unchecked, kills approximately thirty percent of those

afflicted, with most of the rest horribly disfigured. 152 The 1947 smallpox
vaccination program demonstrates how an effective statutory scheme of coercive
treatment can effectively balance the potential for curtailment of contagion offered
by mass vaccination with the imminent risks of harm attendant to the same
strategy.
The Secretary of DHMH, being subject to the governor's oversight,

subordinates the execution of the emergency powers within a well-established
statutory scheme concerning emergency management. 153
This integration
preserves a level of executive review over and above the practical actions of the
Secretary. 54 In itself, this constitutes a system of checks on the exercise of these
powers that does not exist under the MSEHPA. But the most sweeping divergence
between the MSEHPA and the Maryland statute occurs in the procedures invoked
when a person is quarantined or isolated in the event of a declared catastrophic
health emergency.
If the DHMH secretary needs to isolate or quarantine one or more persons,
she or he must provide written notice (unless it is somehow the case that written
notice is impracticable, whereby the secretary must then strive to give notice in the
best way that is possible). 155 This notice must include who is to be quarantined,
where they are to be quarantined, the term of the quarantine, the suspected deadly
agent, why the quarantine is justified, and, most relevant to this examination, the
notice must inform the affected person of the availability of a hearing to contest the
56
directive. 1
In contrast, the provision for notice of the opportunity for a hearing in the
MSEHPA procedural specifications requires only that the affected person be
supplied with a copy of the statute. 157 The availability of a hearing under
MSEHPA must be gleaned not from the directive itself, but rather from a reading
of the statute. In the MSEHPA these specifications appear under the heading,
158
"Temporary isolation and quarantine without notice."'

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. SBIR Grant Awarded to Develop Anti-Smallpox Therapeutics, MED. LETTER ON THE CDC &
FDA, Oct. 12, 2003, at 46.
153. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 14-3 (2003).

154. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 14-3A-03(b) (Supp. 2004) (listing the orders the
Governor can issue to the Secretary).
155. Id. § 14-3A-05.
156. ld. § 14-3A-05(b)(1).
157. MSEHPA supra note 2, § 605(a)(2)(v).
158. Id.
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Under the Maryland Act the hearing to contest the quarantine directive, once
59
requested, must take place within seventy-two hours of the receipt of the request.,
The Maryland statute provides no formal guidance as to what constitutes a request,
but unlike the MSEHPA, which specifies two different scheduling requirements one for petitions for release, 60 and another for petitions alleging a breach of
conditions' 61 - the Maryland Act provides a unified procedural timeline regardless
of the nature of the request. 62 The bifurcation of procedural requirements in the
MSEHPA increases the burden on the affected person, requiring him or her to
comprehend the language of the statute provided in the quarantine directive. This
stands in stark contrast to the notice of the availability of a hearing, with a single
procedural schedule, provided with the Maryland directive.
The seventy-two-hour time frame specified in the Maryland Act may be
extended, but the change must come from the court. 163 In considering whether to
extend the time for the hearing, the statute directs the court to consider, "the rights
of the affected individual.., the protection of the public health, the severity of the
catastrophic health emergency, and the availability of any necessary witnesses and
64
evidence."'
The Maryland statute also provides detailed guidance to the judiciary
regarding how the hearing is to be conducted, given the likelihood that the
individual affected is not available to personally appear in the court.' 65 Such due
process considerations do not appear to extend to individuals from whom property
has been appropriated, with existing civil due process procedures allowing an
66
affected individual to pursue relief, restoration, or restitution. 1
Under the Maryland Act, the quarantine must be both "necessary" and
"reasonable to prevent or reduce the spread of the disease or outbreak ... caused
by exposure to the deadly agent.' 67 If the executive has failed to meet these two
criteria, the court "shall" grant the request for relief. 68 This mandatory, plain
language directive is not found, directly or by analogy, in the MSEHPA.
Also under the Maryland statute, a quarantine or isolation order is effective
for a maximum of thirty days, but the secretary may extend the quarantine in

159. Id. § 14-3A-05(c)(3).
160. MSEHPA supra note 2, § 605(c)(1).
161. Id. § 605(c)(2).
162. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 14-3A-05(c) (Supp. 2004).

163. Id. § 14-3A-05(c)(4).
164. Id. § 14-3A-05(c)(4)(ii).
165. Id. § 14-3A-05(e).
166. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14-206 (2003) (providing for an administrative hearing to
determine whether a taking of property during an emergency is justified).
167. Id. § 14-3A-05(c)(5)(i).
168. Id.
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thirty-day periods, each subject to the notice and procedural requirements initially
169
imposed.
A comparison of the Maryland Act with the MSEHPA reveals language and
provisions in the Maryland Act which enhance the assurance of actual notice to the
affected person. Additionally, the simplified procedural scheme for challenges to
an order for isolation or quarantine relieve the interpretative burden both on the
affected person and his or her counsel. Finally, the Maryland Act gives clear and
unambiguous direction to the judiciary mandating release as a remedy when
warranted.

IX. CONCLUSION

Both the MSEHPA and the Maryland statute attempt to balance the values of
life, liberty, and property with the necessity of a viable defense against an NBC
attack. Both documents implicitly acknowledge that these fundamental aspects of
being fully human are logically dependant on the life that possesses the property or
that lives in freedom. The Maryland statute, adopted without much debate or
public notice, 7 ° was considered during a period when, as William Safire recently
wrote, "The right to be let alone had to be balanced against the right to stay
alive. , ' 7'
In comparison to the MSHEPA, the Maryland statute provides greater and
more detailed guidance as to how the state may attempt to control the damage of a
large-scale terrorist attack precipitating a health emergency. These provisions
provide enhanced protections for persons for whom MSHEPA measures could be
fatal. Although predicting the optimal combination of public health policy and
civil liberties protection is an uncertain endeavor, the Maryland Act is a more
reasonable initial formulation than the MSHEPA.

169. Id. § 14-3A-05(d).
170. The (Baltimore) Sun coverage of the statute is quoted here, in its entirety:
The proposals for responding to a chemical or biological attack would clarify the
governor's ability to declare a catastrophic health emergency. If an emergency was
declared, the health secretary could quarantine people if they were exposed to a
deadly communicable disease. [Governor Glendening's Communications Director,
Mike] Morrill said such authority would be used sparingly and only as a last resort.
But [ACLU attorney David] Roach said the bill 'raises potential civil liberties
concerns.' Del. Joseph F. Vallario Jr., chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
said legislators would safeguard civil liberties. 'We are going to do our best to make
sure the bill protects the liberties of our state, but protects the public,' said the Prince
George's County Democrat.
Tim Craig, Governor, Assembly Leaders Agree on Anti-terrorism Bills; Package Would Allow Broader
Investigation;ACLU Has 'Concerns,'BALT. SUN, Jan. 23, 2002, at I B.
171. William Satire, Privacy in Retreat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004, at A27.
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As time lengthens the perspective of the legislature, the measures that the
Maryland statute allow should be carefully reviewed in light of current social
needs, while keeping ever mindful that the rights and values at stake could not be
more interdependent and fundamental.

